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In the early 1990s not a single Western government agreed to sell arms to the 
newly independent Estonia. As the constitutional government of Mart Laar 
(1992) declared a strong interest in Western collective security, even NATO 
membership, Soviet weapons became unacceptable and insupportable. In con-
trast, a plentiful supply of highly vaunted Western arms was considered a guar-
antee for the Republic’s continued independence and a precondition for future 
acceptance in Western security policy structures – and ultimately membership 
in NATO.
Estonian businessman Leonid Apananski had tested the waters for a weap-
ons deal with Israel already in the autumn of 1991. After Mr Laar’s government 
had taken office in October 1992, our negotiations and contacts with the Israeli 
partners continued in Tallinn, Israel and Helsinki. The contracts for a secret deal 
were signed in January 1993 in Tallinn. We purchased armaments for a rein-
forced light infantry division and they were up to NATO standard. At a cost of 60 
million US dollars they turned out more expensive than Chinese or Romanian 
weapons, but decidedly less expensive than European equivalents. Since Estonia 
lacked the financial resources for such a purchase at that time, the deal became 
possible only due to a favourable hire-purchase method, which took into account 
the expected economic growth of Estonia.
The associated opportunities for increased economic, political and security 
cooperation with Israel, that the negotiated arms deal may have presented, were 
lost before they were fully envisaged. The Estonian side leaked details of the con-
tract, thereby violating the agreement. Estonian revanchist ‘former’ politicians, 
shoddy post-Soviet media and the ill-informed public have mostly attacked 
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the Israeli weapons deal over the last 20 years, even resorting, at times, to anti-
Semitic comments. 
However, this deal was one of the most significant achievements of our 
first constitutional government. It was a breakthrough in arming the Estonian 
Defence Forces and sent a strong signal to Western security decision-makers, 
who were compelled to recognize Estonia as a partner to be taken seriously. I am 
personally proud to have contributed to landing the deal, which was endorsed by 
President Lennart Meri in Tallinn and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Tel Aviv. 
Even today (2014) our Israeli arms are an important element in the arsenal of the 
Estonian Defence Forces.
Background
As the Minister of Defence of the first post-war constitutional govern-
ment, my work did not involve staffing, funding and structuring of the 
Ministry alone. My responsibility extended to reorganising the Defence 
Forces (National Defence Concept,1 legislation, taking to task the muti-
nous (voluntary) light infantry company at Pullapää2), the dysfunctional 
Defence League, the ‘red polkovniks’, and procuring all kinds of equip-
ment and material for our units. Our men basically lacked everything 
from socks and underwear to decent barracks, not to mention con-
temporary training and medical facilities and – oh, to dream! – apart-
ments for officers. However, the most notable deficiency for the soldiers 
was weaponry. Only a well-armed national defence would be taken 
seriously. 
When Mart Laar’s government was appointed in October 1992, the 
Republic of Estonia was almost unarmed, with the exception of a couple 
1 See Hain Rebas “Accidental or Deliberate Failure? Story of the First Defence Concept of 
Estonian National Defence of 1993”, see this yearbook p. 217 ff.
2 Hain Rebas, Raport minister Andi Meistri komisjonile, Tallinn, 23.8.1993; idem, “Eesti kait-
seministri ametist lahkumine,” – Eesti Teadusliku Seltsi Rootsis aastaraamat = Annales Societa-
tis Litterarum Estonicae in Svecia, 2000–2003, XIII (Stockholm 2006,) 105–120; idem, “Kuid 
siiski…” Kaitseministri ametist lahkumine 1993. aastal,” Läänemaa Muuseumi toimetised XI 
(2008): 132–156; Imre Kaas, Jäägrikriisi anatoomia (Tallinn: Pegasus, 2013).
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of thousand3 cheap Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifles manufactured in 
Romania. They were so imprecise that they were said to ‘shoot around the 
corner’... Essential funds were lacking, too. For instance, the chief of sup-
plies at the Ministry of Defence4 routinely had to walk up to Toompea (the 
government’s residence) to beg money for the Ministry’s daily activities.
At the same time, we were seriously concerned about the fragile 
security of our fledgling state. Sergey Karaganov from our large eastern 
neighbour was formulating an aggressive foreign policy doctrine against 
Russia’s ‘near abroad’. Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and 
Defence Minister Pavel Grachev made no attempt to hide their hostil-
ity towards Estonia. The mood around the mainly Russian-speaking city 
of Narva was constantly rebellious, and thousands of armed post-Soviet 
(now Russian) soldiers were carrying out manoeuvres in Estonia without 
any surveillance. The Russian 76th Guards Air Assault Division of Pskov 
and the spetsnaz units that had been training in Viljandi only recently, 
regrouped and continued activities just outside Estonia’s southeast bor-
der. The country, and Tallinn in particular, was full of con men, mobsters 
from Krasnodar, Perm, and the Poultry Factory gang, agents and spies 
of many categories. The international metal business through ‘Metallinn’, 
supported by former KGB officers, was flourishing alongside all of the 
rubbish that this kind of activity attracts.
Our new government, which represented the spirit of the University 
of Tartu, was not prepared to tolerate this. The Constitution and refer-
endum had given us a clear mandate to rehabilitate the state, to clean it 
up and to make the lives of Estonian people as normal as possible. We 
optimistically concluded that, to this end, we had to create a strong foun-
dation on which we could build (as Archimedes had done in his day). We 
had to restore the Defence Forces of Estonia. If we had to, we would fight 
every possible enemy or attacker of the state. This meant that we had to 
secure weapons as quickly as possible: good weapons and many weapons.
3 Only two to three hundred Kalashnikovs were mentioned in public.
4 Pointing out the weakness of the Ministry and especially its chief of supplies, Chief of 
Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces Colonel Laaneots spoke of him using the Russian word 
бухгалтер (accountant), which I understood very well, as I speak German. (Author’s comment 
both here and hereinafter.)
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This ‘Israeli arms deal’ topic has been the subject of heated polemics in 
Estonia for more than 20 years. However, unlike the debaters before me – 
of which there is certainly no shortage – I have tried to piece together 
the fragments of my recollections, the notes I took at the time, and the 
recollections of the individuals directly involved. Leonid Apananski, Priit 
Heinsalu, Ants Laaneots, Jaan Manitski, Jüri Pihl and Tiit Pruuli kindly 
let me profit from their recollections of the past.5 Mart Laar also approved 
the text.6 This database of sources, the contract itself (the English original) 
and the relevant protocols of the Riigikogu, provide a fresh angle to my 
account and make it possible to identify connections that have hitherto 
not been acknowledged. Despite this, I am not aiming for dissertation-
style perfection, because archive materials and memories from the Israeli 
side have not been used.
Task and problems
Estonia had tried to procure weapons before the autumn of 1992, natu-
rally. However, every modest attempt to contact the West in this regard 
had failed. Against this backdrop, there was no question but that our new 
weapons had to be ‘Western’, i.e. without a hint of anything Soviet – not, 
as they said, ‘morally depreciated’. They had to be in line with the stan-
dards of NATO because we needed to demonstrate our firm desire to inte-
grate with the West. However, Western leaders at the time generally held a 
5 Scientist and businessman Leonid Apananski was the one who actually built bridges with 
Israel and masterminded the weapons deal. Mathematician Priit Heinsalu was the Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Defence at the time. Retired General Ants Laaneots was a colonel 
and Chief of Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces. Economist Jaan Manitski was the Foreign 
Minister in Tiit Vähi’s transition government in 1992 and later became a high-ranking state 
official. Jüri Pihl was the Director General of the Estonian Internal Security Service and later 
became the Minister of Justice. Journalist Tiit Pruuli was the closest adviser to the Prime Min-
ister, historian Mart Laar, and proved to be the most operative member of his so-called back 
room. I would like to thank everyone for their kind support (and trust). I take full responsibil-
ity for any errors and (invalid) opinions. I have given delivered my e-mail correspondence with 
the persons named above to the Estonian War Museum.
6 E-mail from Mart Laar to the author of 21 July 2014: “That’s the way I remember it. Thank 
you for all your great work, back then and now.”
235Republic of Estonia on the Road Back to the West…
pro-Russia perspective and did not entertain the notion that Russia may 
present a threat; nobody was prepared to sell us weapons. They all feared 
that this would weaken Holy International Stability. In fact, officials in 
Western capitals, especially in George Bush’s Washington, distrusted us, 
largely unfamiliar ‘Eastern Europeans’ as we were seen, with Russian sol-
diers, armed to their teeth, roaming about our countryside.
Yes, we had received a lot of general and valuable military equipment, 
but no weapons. For example, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, 
who was always very friendly towards us, visited Estonia as early as the 
27th of October 1992. In answer to my requests, he promised to send us 
old Swedish winter uniforms (m/58), bicycles and skis,7 but not the Mauser 
rifles of Hemvärnet8 that were almost a hundred years old and earmarked 
for destruction (m/96). We were also denied the ability to purchase the 
old Walther PP cal. 32 handguns of the Swedish police, even though they 
were to be replaced.9 The Walthers were sold far away in South America… 
No matter who looked at us, we were seen as a tiny, complicated and both-
ersome neighbour with difficult domestic and foreign problems.
Israel
But there was hope! Immediately after the government of Mart Laar took 
office, it became obvious that there was one Western state that would 
agree to sell us good, Western-style arms. That state was Israel, via its 
military manufacturer TAAS.10 Estonian businessman Leonid Apananski 
had been given the signal in Tel Aviv, already a year before the inaugura-
7 So-called (ironically) ‘Vita blixten’ or ‘White Lightning’. We later discovered that the ship-
ment of m/58 winter uniforms we received hid a number of pre-war second-hand uniforms 
m/39, which comes as no surprise to anyone who is familiar with the main motto of the ware-
house chief of the army of any corner of the world: “Always send out as much outdated and 
damaged stuff as possible.”
8 The voluntary territorial national defence organisation of Sweden, similar to the Estonian 
Defence League.
9 I looked into this with Jaak Jüriado and Jüri Adams of the Estonian National Independence 
Party in 1991 and 1992.
10 TAAS-Israel Industries Ltd. (also Israel Military Industries Ltd. (IMI))
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tion of our government.11 He tells us (2014), that the prelude to the weap-
ons deal began in early autumn of 1991 in the Palace Hotel restaurant in 
Tallinn. Old acquaintances from their time in the Academy of Sciences, 
Foreign Minister Lennart Meri and Leonid Apananski – both educated 
men who dared to think big – were having dinner. Their discussions of 
foreign policy concluded with their mutual understanding that the inde-
pendence of Estonia could not be guaranteed by international, diplo-
matic recognition alone; it needed strong financial and military support. 
This meant economic independence, general acceptance by the world 
of finance, national defence capacity as recognised by our neighbours, 
and well-trained and well-armed Defence Forces. Apananski, a man with 
many international contacts, proposed that Estonia could try to procure 
weapons from Israel. The enthusiastic Foreign Minister found the idea 
appealing, if utopian.
The next chapter was written in Tel Aviv, where Apananski was per-
mitted to meet Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin and his immediate 
circle via one of his acquaintances, who happened to be a family member 
of Rabin’s. It became apparent that the opinion of leading Israelis about 
the future of Estonia coincided with that voiced in the Palace Hotel – free 
Estonia required guaranteed security in the form of arms and recognition 
of the world of finance. They also agreed that the USA and NATO mem-
bers were least likely to provide weapons, and that Israel may be alone in 
extending this possibility. Despite Apananski’s claim that a poor country 
like Estonia could not afford to purchase any large quantities of weapons, 
attorney Ran Gazit,12 who had been authorised by the Republic of Esto-
nia to enter negotiations, suggested an intriguing combination: namely, a 
national insurance company of Israel would pay for the transaction. Esto-
nia could then be extended credit, i.e. the option to pay for the procure-
ment in instalments, according to the country’s future ability to make pay-
11 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014. This long and detailed e-mail message 
is the main source of the overview of the following prelude.
12 Attorney Ran Gazit was authorised by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Estonia Toivo Kuld-
sepp to represent the interests of the Republic of Estonia. His remuneration was paid by Mr 
Apananski. (E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.)
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ments, a reasonable and low-risk assumption. To process the plan Estonian 
promissory notes were to be created. They would then be internationally 
recognised as securities, as they would be guaranteed by a country whose 
authority in the world of finance was unquestionable – Israel.
Back in Tallinn, Leonid Apananski again met with Foreign Minister 
Meri, who had decided to proceed with the plan, as he considered it to be 
consistent with Estonia’s interests. It was surely evident to him that this 
may be the only real opportunity to procure the weapons Estonia needed. 
An official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was issued, which 
appointed Mr Apananski the official representative of the Republic of 
Estonia in Israel. When he was received in the Foreign Ministry in Tel 
Aviv some time later, Prime Minister Rabin, via his bureau chief Eitan 
Haber, ordered the Israeli Ministries of Defence and Finance, the national 
insurance company, TAAS and other companies engaged in the military, 
to support Estonia’s representative in any way they could.
Leonid Apananski now changed his playing field and won the support 
of the experienced Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia Ernst Jaakson 
in New York, with whom he met twice. Ambassador Jaakson was an old 
and cautious man and aware of the firm objection of the Americans, so 
he was sceptical about the success of the plan. Nevertheless, Apananski’s 
old friend, entrepreneur and a leading politician of the Estonian Coali-
tion Party, Riivo Sinijärv, who in 1993 himself became the Ambassador 
of Estonia to London and later the Foreign Minister, also supported the 
plan; he neither had faith in its success.
This entire prelude lasted from autumn 1991 to late summer 1992.13 
Then the results of the first constitutional presidential and Riigikogu elec-
tions in Estonia, due to take place in September 1992, were awaited. In 
September 1992 Lennart Meri was elected president and Mart Laar prime 
minister.
Meanwhile, by early June 1992, Leonid Apananski had managed to 
establish relations with Toomas Puura, deputy to Ülo Uluots, Defence 
Minister in Tiit Vähi’s Coalition Party transitional government. On behalf 
of the Republic of Estonia, Mr Puura allegedly authorised Mr Apananski 
13 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
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(using the official stationery of the Government Office) to communicate 
“with Authorities and Institutions of Israel for the procurement of weap-
ons for the Armed Forces of Estonia”.14 I inherited Mr Puura from my 
predecessor Uluots when he left office at the end of October 1992.
My diary15 reveals that I first met with Mr Apananski and Mr Puura 
by chance at Helsinki Vantaa Airport between 5.00 and 6.00 p.m. on the 
19th of October. I was on my way to Tallinn to take up the position of 
Defence Minister. Suddenly, I saw a familiar face in the terminal – Colo-
nel Laaneots! He was accompanied by two people I had not yet met. They 
introduced themselves as Leonid Apananski and Toomas Puura. They 
were on their way to Israel to study the Israeli arms industry and its prod-
ucts. General Laaneots recalls (2014): “Puura’s suggestion to fly to Israel 
in October 1992 and take a look at their military industry (which was 
how he formulated it) was rather unexpected to me and came a short time 
before departure. He said nothing about purchasing weapons. I met Leo-
nid Apananski for the first time right before departure.”16 In 1992 I already 
knew that Colonel Laaneots was an expert on weapons. When I asked Mr 
Puura directly during this chance meeting at Vantaa, he replied that yes, 
he was also an expert on weapons. “Great – let me know how it all went 
when you’re back in Tallinn!” I invited, in conclusion of our meeting. 
Apparently, Mr Puura had told the Defence Minister Uluots, that he 
had been dispatched by Mart Laar and that the Government Office would 
cover his expenses.17 There are several reasons to doubt this.18
14 Government Office of the Republic of Estonia, 8 June 1992, No 1/6, copy in author’s archive.
15 I still have the beautifully bound DIN A4 hourly diary Tidkalender that I got from Sweden. 
I used to take rather meticulous notes of who I met, when, and sometimes also what we talked 
about and what conclusions we arrived at. All of the dates and times given in this article are 
taken from the diary.
16 E-mail from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014.
17 Ülo Uluots, “Mälestused” /Memoirs/ (serial), Rahva Hääl, autumn 1993; “The visit had been 
approved in advance by candidate Prime Minister Mart Laar”, Toomas Puura, Presentation on 
Visit to Israel, 6 December 1992, copy in author’s archive. Mr Apananski, for instance, covered 
his own travel expenses. (E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014).
18 To Tiit Pruuli’s knowledge, Toomas Puura did not receive any authorisation or recommen-
dations for travelling to Israel before Mart Laar took office on 22 October 1992. (E-mail from 
Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014).
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After taking office in Tallinn at the end of October 1992, I soon 
suspected my inherited deputy of corrupt transactions with regards to 
both the huge real estate and property left behind by the Russian army 
and with weapons from Finland. When I encountered him again in the 
Ministry (he had never bothered to inform me of his return or of the 
outcome of his mission), I asked him to deliver a proper written report 
about his Israel visit. His report was poor – one page sparsely filled with 
handwritten text. I asked him for a new, detailed report with all docu-
ments, conclusions and proposals enclosed, “by 3:30 pm tomorrow, on 
my table”.19 Going through it with the author he immediately revealed his 
dilettantism about weapons. In fact, Colonel Laaneots with his very char-
acteristic grimace had already managed to tell me as much on the 6th of 
November.
Colonel Laaneots had presented a long and matter-of-fact report with 
some modest ideas and progressive proposals. In Israel they had been 
introduced to the companies and products of TAAS as well as to weapons 
and equipment of Soviet origin that had been taken as booty from the 
Arabs and kept in warehouses after conservation. The possible purchase 
of weapons was only discussed during the last two days of the visit. Mr 
Puura had asked the Colonel to think about what the Estonian Defence 
Forces would need. Colonel Laaneots then drew up an ad hoc list, consid-
ering the weapons and equipment required for one light infantry division 
(ca 11,000–12,000 men). Money was not yet mentioned.20 In the mean-
time, Mr Apananski had also visited the Ministry, leaving the impres-
sion of a well-informed and professional partner. According to the Prime 
Minister’s diary, his first meeting with Mr Apananski had taken place on 
the 4th  of November.21 However, President Lennart Meri had already 
informed the young Prime Minister about the possibility of a weapons 
deal with Israel. From this point onwards we enjoyed the strong support 
of the Prime Minister.
19 Hain Rebas to Toomas Puura (official), Tallinn, 9 December 1992, copy in author’s archive. 
20 E-mail from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014.
21 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
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At the same time, Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence Priit 
Heinsalu announced sardonically that Mr Apananski, who in addition to 
owning Revalia Bank also owned two insurance companies at the time, 
had offered him the opportunity to secure everything – property, equip-
ment and staff – concerning the Defence Forces, for a certain percentage. 
To put it directly, Mr Apananski had allegedly lured him with an excellent 
opportunity to earn quite a bit on the side.22 Actually, there was nothing 
sensational about such an offer at the time.23 But the more we thought 
about the idea of buying weapons from Israel/TAAS, the more appealing 
became – it was like a hot cinnamon roll you just could not resist.
The ‘Israel issue’ was coordinated among others at the government 
session held on the 15th of November 1992.24 On the following day, 
Mr Apananski and Colonel Laaneots discussed the plan with Prime Min-
ister Laar.25
On the 19th of November I had a longer meeting with Colonel Laane-
ots and Mr Apananski during which the main topic of our conversation 
was, of course, ‘Israel’.26 The topic was gradually heating up. 
A delegation from TAAS arrived in Tallinn on the 3rd of December 
1992. We had a meal at Rataskaevu Restaurant. The Republic of Estonia 
was represented by Colonel Laaneots, Adviser to the Ministry Colonel 
Priks, Secretary General Heinsalu, Mr Apananski and Jaan Manitski, an 
old friend from Gothenburg who had been the Foreign Minister in Tiit 
22 Priit Heinsalu, then Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence, recalls: “The rumour 
circulating in the Ministry and the General Staff, probably leaked from the Security Police, was 
that four or five men had been offered bribes in relation to the weapons procurement. Appar-
ently, only one of them took the bait.” (E-mail from Heinsalu to the author of 4 July 2014).
23 The point of this article is not to reveal possible cases of corruption from 1992/1993. The 
relevant authorities of Estonia failed to do so then, and today it would be a largely hopeless and 
pointless endeavour from a legal point of view. Says Jüri Pihl, who was the Director General 
of the Security Police at the time: “[---] there were attempts to deceive the young Republic of 
Estonia, which had just regained its independence, and the businessmen involved had their 
own interests that weren’t exactly in line with good business practice, but we didn’t have anyone 
better at the time.” (E-mail from Pihl to the author of 13 August 2014).
24 Diary 92.
25 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
26 Diary 92.
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Vähi’s transition government and whom I had invited to come along, 27 
and I myself. Back then Mr Manitski was one of the very few people in 
Estonia who had a background in major international finance. The Israe-
lis were represented by Dan-Erik Melamed-Lemkow, attaché of the Israeli 
Navy to Stockholm and the representative of TAAS in Northern and East-
ern Europe (a man with a Swedish background). The ‘company’, in the 
form of Mr Apananski and lawyer Ran Gazit, operated as the energetic 
engineers of the transaction. I managed to establish a personal connec-
tion with Melamed-Lemkow. We were about the same age; he came from 
Stockholm, and I from Gothenburg. The conversation at the restaurant 
was clearly a probing and preparatory one. Namely, we in Estonia had 
decided to grab this opportunity with both hands. Now we wanted to find 
out how far we could go, how far we dared to go. 
As expected, we initially discussed broader matters, such as the 
history and politics of Israel and Estonia. Only after establishing some 
mutual understanding and familiarity did we get to the main topic – the 
weapons. We discreetly discussed possible quantities and delivery options 
and similarly tentatively touched upon money and payment methods. 
Fortunately for us, the Israelis were interested and seemed gradually to 
begin to trust us. I dare to venture that the experience I brought to the 
ministerial role – as a university professor in Sweden, Germany, Canada 
and Estonia – served in part to advance our relationship. I had taught 
topics such as the history of the European Jewry and the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine – the war of 1948 and of 1956, the so-called Six-Day 
War of 1967 and the so-called Yom Kippur War of 1973. Similar to Prime 
Minister Mart Laar, an historian, I was also well informed about the 
tragic fate of Jews in Estonia.28 We later discovered that our informed and 
sympathetic background and the clearly Western European stance of our 
government paid off in subsequent negotiations. 
27 We both belong to the Estonian Students Society (EÜS) and were on the board of the Esto-
nian Student Body of Gothenburg in the 1960s. 
28 See Raoul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 
1994); the articles of Peter Puide from early 1990 in the Swedish and Swedish-Estonian media; 
Kopl Jokton, Juutide ajaloost Eestis (Tartu: TÜ trükikoda, 1992).
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The Israelis insisted that both sides had to be most discreet or the 
transaction would be called off. Of course we agreed. They were feeling 
the cold breath of Big Brother from across the pond on their necks, and 
we on our side knew only too well who from the East would be hell-bent 
on sinking the deal.
Israel was discussed again at the government session of the 8th of 
December.29 We also gave the Ministry of the Interior (border guards and 
police/security police) an option to order weapons and other equipment 
from Israel. Our primary objective was to fully equip one light infantry 
division, i.e. more than 10,000 men, with weapons from TAAS. No, we 
saw no reason to be shy or modest.
On the 9th of December Leonid Apananski and Jaan Manitski visited 
the Prime Minister to once again discuss the Israeli weapons deal.30 It 
should be noted that at its session of the 10th of December, the govern-
ment allocated 500,000 Estonian kroons for ‘Chinese weapons’.31 Among 
other items, we bought 3,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition 
from China. It was only natural that we procured weapons and equip-
ment from other countries as well to the extent we were able.
On the 11th of December Colonel Laaneots came to the Ministry in 
Pikk Street with a list of weapons he had mostly chosen himself, their 
quantities and the official price list of TAAS. Together we headed to 
Toompea to give detailed explanations to the Prime Minister.32
An important ceremony of the Jewish community in Tallinn was held 
in the History Museum at 1.00 p.m. the same day33 and I went there on 
my own initiative to represent the Republic of Estonia. This came as a sur-
prise and maybe even a shock to the older generation who had gathered 
there.34 Of course the government had to gain and maintain the support 
of the local Jewish community. At the ceremony I again met the Israeli 
29 Diary 92.
30 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
31 Diary 92.
32 Ibid.
33 I cannot remember the reason – it could have been Hanukkah.
34 My long friendship with Jakob Kaplan and Elhonen Saks dates back to this day.
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representation and also the Swedish Military Attaché, Colonel Sundkvist, 
a not insignificant figure in the context of this topic and article.35
At 10.00 a.m. on the 14th of December my diary notes “Puura”, and 
at 2.00 p.m. “Puura, Heinsalu, Põder”.36 With the support of the Secretary 
General and the Ministry’s lawyer, I invited my deputy – on suspicion of 
serious corruption – to leave the Ministry of his own accord that very 
afternoon. He complied. At 5.00 p.m. Mr Apananski, Mr Manitski and I 
arrived at the Prime Minister’s office on Toompea.37 Once again, we collec-
35 Due to my Swedish military background (P 7, I 13, Fst Und/Säk: South Skåne Regiment, 
Dalarna Regiment, Military Intelligence and Security Department of the Supreme Commander 
Headquarters) I thought of Colonel Sundkvist as a colleague, ‘one of us’, which is what he also 
proved to be. 
36 Diary 92.
37 The diary of Tiit Pruuli confirms the same. (E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 
2014).
Estonian Defence Minister Hain Rebas (on the right) and Danish Defence 
Minister Hans Hækkerup in the NATO Headquarters (Brussels, 1993). 
Private collection of Hendrik Praks
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tively scrutinized every detail of the pending Israeli/TAAS weapons deal, 
which now had reached its decisive stage. We also touched upon the for-
mal problems related to the dismissal of my Deputy Minister. Finally, late 
in the afternoon, we agreed with the Prime Minister that the maximum 
amount for which we could order weapons was to be 60 million US dollars.
Things now escalated considerably. On the 15th of December I 
entered two personal telephone numbers of Mr Apananski and one per-
sonal number of Colonel Sundkvist in my diary. At 6.00 p.m. that eve-
ning I flew to Helsinki with Colonel Laaneots, Mr Apananski and Mr 
Manitski. There we were first taken to the Estonian Embassy and then to 
the Hotel Hesperia. I stayed in room 852.38 The next morning we were to 
hold a confidential meeting with the TAAS delegation at the Hotel Inter-
Continental.
Preparations
The next question should be: how did Estonia prepare for this major 
political event that was aimed at breaking out of a vicious post-Commu-
nist circle, an event that could even be called historical? Were we really 
as naïve and helpless as we were depicted in many speeches and writings 
from those days and later?
My answer is that we did well, even very well. In any case we achieved 
the absolute best that was possible in Estonia at the time. In the meantime 
I had kept the President of the Republic á jour with the developments 
every two or three weeks during our late teas at Kadriorg Palace.39 This is 
also where I regularly received the characteristically flamboyant feedback 
of Lennart Meri.
First of all, the team. There was no doubt that Colonel Laaneots, with 
his international background and battle experience, was the the Estonian 
who knew the most about the weapons produced in the world, and who 
was probably also the most knowledgeable about the arms trade. We 
38 Diary 92.
39 Lennart Meri and I had been friends since 1979.
245Republic of Estonia on the Road Back to the West…
should note that US Colonel Aleksander Einseln, our first Commander 
of the Defence Forces, had not arrived in Estonia at this point. Also, as all 
of his subordinates knew, Colonel Laaneots was ‘crazy about weapons’, i.e. 
he had a personal interest in, even passion for, weapons. I felt very secure 
next to such a technical expert. 
It is noteworthy that I did not take along anyone from my own Min-
istry – where staffing was still incomplete – as a financial expert. Instead, 
I invited former Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski, who, prior to arriv-
ing in Estonia from Sweden, had amassed a great fortune with interna-
tional transactions for himself – and for the Swedish pop band ABBA. 
I had complete trust in him and in his abilities from the time we met 
in Gothenburg in the 1960s, when he graduated from the city’s highly 
regarded Handelshögskolan. His education of course included interna-
tional commercial law. Concluding, I could not imagine a more capable 
team then, nor could I imagine one now (in 2014). Furthermore I knew 
that we had the solid support of Kadriorg (the President) and Toompea 
(the government). This spurred us on and boosted our energy.
Secondly, Leonid Apananski. Of course he was a businessman with 
significant personal interests. As a person, he was always punctual, busi-
ness-like, even friendly. It was later that I discovered that he had quickly 
established relations in the governing Israeli Labour Party, even in the 
government, and knew a family member of legendary Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin. In other words, Mr Apananski was a capable and intriguing 
person, but completely unfamiliar to me. In the interests of national secu-
rity, and also to cover my own back, I ordered two background checks on 
him from two different sources – one from the Estonian Security Police, 
and the other from the Israelis. I presumed that if the latter – the world 
champions in intelligence – found nothing suspicious about him, then we 
too could carry on working together. Israeli Attaché Melamed-Lemkow 
gave me that reassurance.
The background check done in Estonia was prepared by Director 
General of the Security Police Jüri Pihl, who personally delivered it to 
me in the Ministry. We went through it together over a cup of coffee. 
There was nothing very sensational in it, and above all, no three letters 
acronyms... I smiled and decided to ask Pihl later about his statement 
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that Mr Apananski “in the past had financed the trips abroad of many 
leading Estonian politicians”. I wondered: whose trips, why and for what 
purpose? This document, signed by Mr Pihl, is probably still gathering 
dust in a safe or archive of the Ministry of Defence. In the end my possible 
concerns were satisfied by the reports that Mr Apananski did not appear 
to have anything obviously suspicious about him. In other words, we were 
dealing with a professional in international economic matters. However, 
I rejected his friendly offer to pay the travel expenses of our delegation to 
Helsinki: “The expenses of the delegation of the Republic of Estonia will 
be paid by the Republic of Estonia,” I confirmed.
Thirdly, weapons and their prices. Naturally, we did not only look 
at the quality, indicators and compatibility of the weapons and other 
equipment offered by TAAS; we also looked at the prices. To get a bet-
ter overview we certainly compared them to the weapons and prices of 
other producers. I remember well sitting in my office, surrounded by all 
kinds of colourful catalogues and price lists. But as this was still relatively 
unfamiliar territory, I wanted additional assurances, and so I contacted 
the Swedish Attaché, Colonel Sundkvist, as ‘one of ours’.40 I asked him to 
quietly investigate the quality and prices of TAAS’s weapons and tell me 
his findings. That is exactly what he did.
So, all three of us – the Defence Forces Headquarters or Colonel 
Laaneots personally, the Ministry, in other words I myself, and Colonel 
Sundkvist – arrived at the same conclusion: the weapons, i.e. all these 
Uzis, Galils, Negevs, MAPATS and whatever they were called, complied 
with NATO standards and were of high-quality.41 The main weapon, the 
Galil assault rifle, was a modification of the bulky AK-47 or Kalashnikov 
of the Russians.42 If the mechanism of the Galil could handle the dust 
40 Myself, Colonel Sundkvist and Carl Bildt’s special envoy Lars Peter Fredén (see his books 
Förvandlingar: Baltikums frigörelse och svensk diplomati 1989–1991 (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2004) 
and Återkomster: svensk säkerhetspolitik och de baltiska ländernas första år i självständighet, 
1991–1994 (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2006)) agreed that we as a principle were not primarily work-
ing for special, ecxlusive national interests of Sweden or Estonia, but at considerably broader 
common and overlapping goals – getting life in the Baltic Sea region back to normal.
41 Colonel Aleksander Einseln, who arrived in Estonia later, was very sceptical about MAPATS.
42 The Galil was much bulkier than the American M16, but more accurate than the Kalashnikov.
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and sand of the Sinai desert, it could certainly handle wet and melting 
snow in Estonian forests. And every soldier knows that just like engines, 
weapons also have to be oiled differently in different conditions! We soon 
learned that Israel had delivered its weapons all over the world, including 
the highly quality-conscious Switzerland and South Africa, but of course 
not to Arab countries. In terms of Israeli arms I could not even imagine 
anything below the highest level, as Israel is almost constantly at war and 
adjusts its weaponry according to the changing times and improvements 
of its enemy.43 The knowledge that their enemies used Soviet or Russian 
weapons added a certain spice.
The only negative aspect of the Israeli/TAAS weapons was the price: 
they seemed to be horrendously expensive. In any case, we dared to hope 
for a decent discount because of the large quantity we were going to order 
and because of all the accompanying off-sets and spin-offs we were think-
ing of.
Goals and mutual interests
Our negotiations with the TAAS delegation revealed that the Israelis were 
mainly interested in four things in Estonia. Firstly, Estonian forests and 
forest products – since they do not have the kind of ancient woods we 
do. Their population was growing strongly at the time due to the inflow 
of immigrants and they needed facilities, structures and houses, i.e. logs. 
Here, Estonian children who had finally been released from Soviet condi-
tions, needed vitamins and healthy food. We sometimes even discussed 
43 I hereby disagree with the official confidential opinion of Auditor General Hindrek Meri 
of 4 August 1995 (“Loe riigikontrolör Hindrek Meri salajast kirja valitsusele aastast 1995,” /
Read a secret letter from Auditor General Hindrek Meri to the Government from 1995/, Eesti 
Ekspress, 15.6.2012, http://ekspress.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/loe-riigikontrolor-hindrek-
meri-salajast-kirja-valitsusele-aastast-1995.d?id=64544584 (accessed 5.9.2014).), that “some of 
the weaponry is unsuitable or unusable due to our climatic conditions”. I regret that I was away 
from Estonia in 1995 and that Hindrek Meri did not consult me about this. Besides, he failed 
to consider the actual and security policy situation in 1992 and 1993 in his bureaucratic and 
anachronistic presentation.
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primitive barter deals – Estonian forests for the Israelis for Jaffa oranges 
and other fruits and vegetables for us.
Secondly, our Israeli partners had noted with concern that hostile 
Islamist organisations were getting closer to Europe through Russia. 
Apparently, Islamist cells were already present in Riga. Tallinn would 
then have been an excellent base for Israeli counter-intelligence. Thirdly, 
they were naturally hoping for foreign policy support from Estonia in 
the UN and elsewhere. The fourth aspect was the opening of a new east-
ern market via Tallinn, especially for the export of weapons. Exporting 
Estonian oil shale technology to Israel also seemed possible at the time. 
These, however, were topics for the Prime Minister and other ministers 
to discuss.
There have been claims in the media that the Israelis demanded, 
probably for Yad Vashem and the Wiesenthal Centre, archive materials 
about the crimes against humanity committed in German-occupied Esto-
nia (1941–1944). Nobody ever requested such materials from me.44
So our major strategic decisions had been made: Estonia and its 
fledgling defence forces had to integrate with the West as quickly as pos-
sible; Israel/TAAS (who had their own specific interests in Estonia) were 
our only option for procuring western-style weapons; and cooperation 
between the Estonians and Israelis kept moving towards ever more inter-
esting projects. 
As our trust in each other increased, we found a principal payment 
system that satisfied both parties, i.e. the multi-annual credit or hire-pur-
chase solution that the Israelis had proposed. No amounts had yet been 
discussed. We did not expect any pleasant surprise in ths regard. At the 
same time, we pinned our hopes on Estonia’s economic growth that had 
been forecasted for the coming years, as it would reduce the debt burden 
every year.
44 Years later, I heard that the materials of the notorious Klooga concentration camp that were 
kept in the Estonian History Museum had been sent to Israel. They can now be seen in the per-
manent exhibition of Yad Vashem. (E-mail from Toomas Hiio to the author of 20 June 2014). In 
1993, the Israelis requested material about Evald Mikson, but were denied. (E-mail from Pruuli 
to the author of 15 July 2014).
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Alongside weapons, we also requested instructors to teach our soldiers 
how to use them, as was customary. And whenever weapons instructors 
arrive, tactics instructors are not far behind. All of our existing tactics 
instructors came from the incondite Soviet army. We now needed junior 
and senior officers used to western-style warfare, who would first show us 
how to place these new weapons in position and then how to use them as 
a system in mutual cooperation, in defence and attack, from platoons up 
to brigades. This way, with the help of Israel, we would have taken a huge 
step forward in training our Defence Forces.
And speaking of expensive weapons, it is also necessary to maintain 
and repair them as required and to produce (cheap) ammunition, spare 
parts and other simpler products for ourselves. In these areas at least we 
wanted to be self-sufficient from the very beginning. This is why the Min-
istry of Defence planned to restore Arsenal – the pre-war Estonian mili-
tary industry. The Israelis promised to help us with their expertise in this 
venture as well.
Throughout this time Leonid Apananski and Ran Gazit worked as 
tireless and inventive liaison officers between Estonia and TAAS, until 
our entry into the contract, and even thereafter.45
And last but not least, with the tactics instructors present, why not 
invite instructors in border-guarding and anti-terrorism? We definitely 
needed them. Because who knew what was in store for us? The Israelis 
were, and still are, among the top players in the world in these areas. For 
this reason, and on my initiative, we invited the former Chief of Staff 
of the Israel Defence Forces and present member of the management of 
TAAS General Dan Shomron to Estonia. He was a legend who in 1976 
had brilliantly commanded the release of the hijacked Israeli plane and 
hostages at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. General Shomron visited Esto-
nia from 21–23 March and met with the President and Prime Minister. 
Unfortunately, his presentation for our officers seemed to have no visible 
impact on them.46
45 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
46 See Google and Wikipedia, for example: “Entebbe” and “Dan Shomron”; “[Situation is 
Critical] Assault On Entebbe Full Documentary,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
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In sum, I maintained then, as I repeat today (2014), that we had done 
our homework as well and exhaustively as we could, considering the con-
ditions in Estonia at the time. We arranged the best possible team, with 
everyone’s roles well defined and coordinated, and both Toompea and 
Kadriorg supported us. Our partners were also seriously interested in 
further cooperation. We were feeling good as we went into the battle of 
negotiations in Helsinki.
Negotiations in Helsinki:  
Wednesday, the 16th of December 1992
Over brunch at the InterContinental in Helsinki, it took us a couple of 
hours to prepare a contract that was more or less fit for signing. Colo-
nel Laaneots showed remarkable grit and professionalism. This is how 
he remembers the events: “The negotiations with the representatives of 
TAAS were difficult. They started by telling me that most of the heavy 
weapons on the list I’d sent Israel would be left out, as the amount for pur-
chasing them was too small. This concerned howitzers, 120-mm mortars 
and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. I still tried to stick to procuring 
complete weaponry and equipment (communication devices, flak jack-
ets etc.) for 11,000 to 12,000 men. It was hard work, but we more or less 
achieved it after battling it out for several days. Our partners were not 
happy with us; I reckon they thought their profit was too small.”47
=TTEkQcYS0w8 (accessed 5.9.2014); see also the feature film “Operation Thunderbolt” (Israel, 
1977), YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFeDt0eVcTE (accessed 5.9.2014).
47 E-mail from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014. Laaneots also wrote: “They tried to 
make up for it later (i.e. in spring 1994) by shipping 50 used 23-mm anti-aircraft cannons to 
Estonia. Fortunately, we opened it immediately and started complaining at the levels of both the 
General Staff of the Defence Forces and the Ministry. In order to avoid scandal, TAAS promised 
to immediately send us new cannons and we could keep the old ones as a gift.” This outcome 
did not really come as a surprise. (See also reference number 7.) The warehouse managers of the 
Israeli army saw our impressive order as a golden opportunity to freely rid themselves of their 
scraps. Mr Apananski added in explanation of the circumstances: “The price of the Russian anti-
aircraft cannons ZU-23-2 in the contract was just the price of delivery, so they were basically 
free. After the public scandal broke, I met with Mr Rabin and convinced him that ordering new 
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In the meantime Mr Apananski was manoeuvring in the background, 
discreet and steady as always. In addition to the general national goal, i.e. 
the successful completion of the weapons transaction to improve Esto-
nia’s international reputation and create Estonian securities in the for-
mat of promissory notes, he of course also had certain personal inter-
ests. However, as professionals, we did not stick our noses in his wallet. 
At home, Mr Apananski seemed to have two significant interests, which 
he also repeatedly presented to the Prime Minister: the privatisation of 
international Viru Hotel, and some real estate left behind by the Russian 
army.48 It is to be noted that my dismissed Deputy Minister had tried to 
deal with the same properties. Neither of them got what they wanted. 
However, Mr Apananski later claimed with some degree of satisfaction 
that with our weapons deal he earned “crazy profits, also in the mate-
rial sense”, but even more so in terms of international advertising. “The 
transaction boosted my reputation considerably. I made many profitable 
business agreements after it.”49
The Israelis were professional in Helsinki and their attitude towards us 
was “interested, but restrained”50 – they were friendly but stubborn.51 At 
first, they hadn’t even understood why their political leaders had ordered 
them to deal with us – after all, we were so far away, and moreover, we 
had been part of their former enemy, the Soviet Union. But step by step 
trust grew and the suspicions of the Israelis regarding the Estonian gov-
ernment were allayed.52
cannons and delivering them to Estonia would be cheaper than getting smeared with the lies 
published by the Estonian media. He agreed. TAAS ordered 50 new cannons from Bulgaria and 
delivered them at its own cost.” (E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.)
48 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
49 Astrid Kannel, “Leonid Apananski teenis Iisraeli-Eesti relvatehingult tohutut kasu,” /Leo-
nid Apananski earns huge profits on Israeli-Estonia weapons deal/ (interview), Sõnumileht, 
2.11.1995.
50 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
51 The Israeli delegation consisted of Vice President of Marketing for TAAS Razi Dotan, Vice 
President of TAAS to Northern Europe Zvi Urbach, Sales Manager Yoram Bar-am and our old 
acquaintance Attaché Melamed-Lemkow. They were all former officers of the Israeli armed 
forces.
52 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
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TAAS did not agree to sell us the US-made Stinger anti-aircraft mis-
siles, as they were subject to an American resale ban. We would have been 
unable to afford them in any case. In the area of air defence, we had to 
settle for a couple of Strelas (which may have been privately procured in 
the meantime) and the 23-mm Sergeys,53 which the Israelis had taken as 
trophies and which were very familiar to our men.
Thanks to Mr Manitski’s successful negotiation spurt, we even man-
aged to gain a few percent off the total price. Yes, the weapons ended up 
being more expensive than the familiar Chinese, Bulgarian and Roma-
nian ones, but cheaper than the Western European, i.e. German, Belgian 
and British equivalents – meaning that the final price landed more or less 
at the same level as the US weapon prices. We had no choice anyway.
Signing and what happened next
The contract for purchasing weapons between the Republic of Estonia 
and TAAS was approved after new and even tougher negotiations on the 
night of the 6th of January and signed in the White Hall in Toompea on 
the 7th of January 1993. I can see from my diary that I had a meeting with 
Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste54 at 5.00 p.m. the previous day. It is of 
course easy to reconstruct the topic of our conversation in retrospect. I 
would like to emphasise that this was also a completely new transaction 
for Israel – their first big business deal in a post-Soviet country using a 
credit system that was also new to them. This means that we, the new 
government of the poor Estonia, were trusted both politically and eco-
nomically. This in itself must be seen an achievement.
Upon signing my name on the bulky contract, which consisted of 
seven parts, on the one hand I felt both pride and joy: look, we succeeded, 
we did it! On the other hand, I was somewhat alarmed by the mammoth 
amount for which I was to be responsible until 2000. Fortunately, the 
53 Official name ZU-23-2.
54 Diary 93. Of course, there is no mention of a document that was signed in this diary, kept 
by the secretary of the Ministry since 1993. It was top secret, after all.
253Republic of Estonia on the Road Back to the West…
Government Office was to be in charge of all future payments. There was 
no money for this in the budget of the Ministry of Defence. As always, 
signing such a significant contract was followed by a formal dinner, in 
this case with the Prime Minister and the Israeli delegation.55
As I have already mentioned, the contract was strictly classified. How-
ever, due to our negligence its content was quickly leaked, partly via Kuku 
Radio and partly via our Ministry of Foreign Affairs,56 and the US newspa-
per the Philadelphia Inquirer. Its revealing article was followed by a stern 
diplomatic note from Russia to the United States, who sent an inquiry 
to Israel. The latter replied coldly that TAAS was an independent com-
pany and operated in its own business interests.57 On the morning of the 
9th of January 1993 Rein Lang’s Kuku Radio spoke about negotiations “to 
purchase a large batch of weapons from Israel, intermediated by Leonid 
Apananski”.58 Yes, we were embarrassed. The attitude of TAAS towards us 
after this blunder was obviously ‘reserved’ for quite some time.59
On the 3rd of February we were still playing poker with the Estonian 
public about the weapons deal. We and the Prime Minister neither con-
firmed nor denied the allegations that Estonia was planning to buy weap-
ons from Israel. I kept emphasising that we would of course buy them 
if they could be sold us and we could afford them.60 However, two days 
later, on the 5th of February, the Government paid the first instalment of 
5 million dollars to TAAS.
Reiterating the content and details of the contract and the almost 
hysterical attacks we were subjected to in Estonia seems pointless, and 
55 Also e-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
56 Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste of Pro Patria did not respond to any of the three queries 
I sent him. The nondescript response of his official Eerik-Niiles Kross in USA claiming that 
everything was already known in Washington has been preserved. (E-mail from Pruuli to the 
author of 15 July 2014).
57 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
58 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
59 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
60 Aarne Mägi, “Eesti peab relvaostukõnelusi mitme riigiga,” /Estonia in talks with several 
countries to buy weapons/ (interview), Päevaleht, 3.2.1993; Kalle Muuli, “Läbimurre Läände: 
Eestile 50 miljoni dollari eest Iisraeli relvi?” /Breakthrough to the West: 50 million dollars’ 
worth of Israeli weapons for Estonia?/, Postimees, 4.2.1993.
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responding to them so long post festum even less sensible.61 But – boom! 
Suddenly, all over we had all these big, albeit unknown, security policy 
experts in both the Estonian media and the Riigikogu, crawling out of the 
woodwork with their vivid imaginations and ‘knowledge’. And we sud-
denly had all these exceptional specialists on international weaponry! But 
there were exceptions as well.62 Sometimes we even received some sup-
port, but the cheering of our supporters was hardly heard amid such loud 
noise. This racket – irresponsible in regard to the state and its people, as 
well as ad hominem – lasted for weeks and occasionally even signalled a 
latent anti-Semitism.63
For quite some time, this politically-inspired reaction seriously inter-
fered with our partnership with TAAS. It also jeopardized all promising 
cooperation opportunities with Israel in the future, and – it was all trig-
gered by our own people. 
Also, the Government Office of our poor state did not turn out to be 
the most reliable maker of payments. 64 As the signatory of the contract, 
I complained to the Prime Minister on the 7th of June 1993: “I see it as 
my duty to report that the payment orders from the Government Office 
61 All records of the Riigikogu, newspapers and magazines from those days are available 
online and in libraries and archives.
62 I am pleased to recall the expertise of Sulev Hallik (Sulev Hallik “Kaitseminister Hain 
Rebas: asi liigub, ja see on pinnuks silmas nn. endistele ja ringkondadele väljaspool Eestit,” /
Defence Minister Hain Rebas: Things are moving and it’s a thorn in the side for the so-called 
‘former’ and circles outside Estonia/ (interview), Pühapäevaleht, 6.3.1993), Juhan Paju (Juhan 
Paju, “Paar sõna kaitseministri kaitseks,” /A few words in defence of the Defence Minister/, 
Lääne Elu 2.3.1993), Peeter Tali (Peeter Tali, “Kaitseminister Hain Rebas: kaitsejõud vajavad 
intelligentseid inimesi,” /Defence Minister Hain Rebas: Defence Forces need intelligent peo-
ple/, Postimees, 2.3.1993), Mihkel (Michael) Tarm (Mihkel Tarm, “David prepares for Goliath. 
An interview with the new Estonian minister of defence, Hain Rebas,” Talinn City Paper Nr 6, 
Winter 1993) and Mihkel Tiks (Mihkel Tiks, “Kas Eesti suudab ennast kaitsta?” /Can Estonia 
defend itself?/ (interview), Rahva Hääl 23.7.1993 and 24.7.1993).
63 In the style of George Orwell’s classic novel 1984 (1948), there were obvious attempts to 
stomp the Defence Minister (and others) into the ground and to turn him into a non-person. 
For example, the management of Estonian Television boycotted me from October 1992 to May 
1993. They let people attack and revile me, but offered no chance to respond, to explain what 
was going on in Estonia’s national defence and what we were planning to do. At the time, I spoke 
more about Estonian national defence on Swedish, Finnish and German TV than on ETV.
64 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
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to Israel are chronically late. This means that ca 1.8 million of taxpayers’ 
money has already been spent on default interest to the bank that inter-
mediates the payments. I am truly indignant, as I have pointed this out 
before. The fact that the payment due on 20 May was late by 17 days means 
that once again we ‘gift’ 897,164.79 kroons to the bank. Why? Whose fault 
is this? Who keeps squandering the money of the taxpayers of the Repub-
lic of Estonia?”65 I received no response. And so Mr Apananski again had 
something to iron out in the bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
It has been discussed and debated whether the government’s main-
taining silence and keeping the contract a secret actually gave the opposi-
tion ammunition?66 Without a doubt, the storm of criticism and vilifica-
tion of the contract – and those who signed it – still dominates in the 
Estonian media. Yes, it is easy to speculate, especially post factum. But 
secrecy was the non-negotiable preconditions of the contract. Without 
it, nothing would have worked. We can therefore affirm that by staying 
silent, the government suffered a loss at the tactical media level, but won 
(despite numerous obstacles) in long-term strategic terms. Namely, the 
weapons we ordered arrived and stayed.
Moving on: spring/summer 1993
Despite the heated arguments around the contract, Prime Minister Mart 
Laar himself pushed its ratification through in the Riigikogu in spring 
1993. I am personally grateful to him for doing so. There is no doubt that 
he was better at these verbal street fights than all of the expatriate Esto-
nians who were in Tallinn at the time.
Our Estonian Air pilots flew the first set of weapons to Estonia on 
the 17th of May. It had to be done in secret, as it was against all inter-
national security rules. We were in a rush, and a bit scared as well. An 
ordinary passenger plane was used to conceal the transaction (it was 
65 Original in the Prime Minister’s archive, copies in the archives of the Ministry of Defence 
and the author. See also Raivo Palmaru, “Põhja-Eesti Panga saladused,” /Secrets of the North-
Estonian Bank/, Eesti Sõnumid, 30.8.1995, 1–2.
66 Mart Laar, Eesti uus algus (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2002), 160.
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filled with weapons and ammunition!) and it arrived in Estonia following 
complicated and dangerous airways. This operation, which was diligently, 
if regrettably, made public by Eesti Ekspress, was also followed by an 
unpleasant exchange of diplomatic notes.67 Then, on a nice summer eve-
ning, we organised a dinner for our brave pilots as a modest expression of 
our gratitude. I was also impressed by the inventiveness and flexibility of 
Mr Apananski in coming up with and organising this mode of transport.68
We showcased the new weapons to the Prime Minister and the press 
on the Aegviidu training range just a week later, on the 22th of May. It was 
a lovely early summer day. The Prime Minister’s smile was as bright as the 
sun. The new weapons worked, everything was fine, the onlookers were 
excited. The Prime Minister held a mini-Uzi gently in his arms like it was a 
baby, and the somewhat reluctant Defence Minister too had to try a mini-
Uzi. However, a terrible accident occurred at the end of the event – a cadet 
was killed because he and his chief had both been negligent. By this point 
I had already left the training field with the Prime Minister, but the inci-
dent certainly marred an otherwise successful day. A few weeks later, on 
the 10th of June, officers invited me to try the new Galil sniper rifles from 
400 metres at a shooting range near Tallinn. They were very much OK.
Then, in his usual energetic manner, and on the invitation of Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the 13th of June 1993, Mr Apananski 
organised the visit of one of our most impressive delegations to Israel in 
June 1993. I can see in my diary that I met with Mr Apananski at 2.00 p.m. 
on the 30th of June.69 What else could we have talked about except Israel? 
Our delegation consisted of Prime Minister Laar, Minister of Economic 
Affairs Toomas Sildmäe, Ambassador Alar Olljum, the ‘Special Assis-
tant to the Foreign Minister in Relations to Israel’ Leonid Apananski and 
Adviser to the Prime Minister Tiit Pruuli. 
Pruuli wrote: “The role of Apananski in preparing the visit cannot be 
underestimated. He came to see us (i.e. in the Office of the Prime Minis-
67 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
68 It is usual for people who invent and put together big business plans (so-called consultants) 
to earn good consultation fees.
69 Diary 93.
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ter. Author) several times to discuss which business people we could meet 
with [---]. He advised us to work with attorney Avi Pelossof, who com-
municated directly with the Head of Rabin’s Bureau Haber [---].”70 Post 
festum, Leonid Apananski rated Pruuli’s inventiveness and agility equally 
highly.71
The programme prepared for the Estonian delegation was packed 
with meetings. The Estonian Prime Minister visited the President, the 
Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Knesset, the Foreign Minister and 
the Minister of Trade and Economic Affairs. The delegation also visited 
the Ministry of Defence and had a meeting with the management of 
TAAS. An agreement was made about the formation of a joint workgroup 
of the Ministries of Defence, which was obviously about the production 
of ammunition. Introducing new types of telephones to Estonia and 
building wind generators on the blustery coastline of Estonia were also 
discussed. And finally, a cultural contract was entered into and signed by 
the Prime Ministers.72 Plans were made to invite the Estonian Defence 
Minister with a workgroup to Israel in August 1993 to launch the forma-
tion of an Estonian rapid reaction unit with the help of Israel – something 
our Defence Forces definitely needed.73
And what came of all this? In hindsight, we might seriously ask why 
this all went to waste – why did all these excellent plans came to nothing 
apart from the weapons transaction?
In early August 1993, having been disavowed three times by my 
superiors,74 I resigned as Defence Minister in relation to the so-called 
Pullapää crisis. I am therefore not responsible for the subsequent phases75 
70 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
71 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014. Avi Pelossof was a family member of 
Yitzhak Rabin.
72 E-mail from Pruuli to the author of 15 July 2014.
73 When I sought to present this promising scheme to Acting Minister of the Interior Kaido 
Kama a few weeks after my resignation, he did not even bother to see me.
74 By Prime Minister Mart Laar, Acting Prime Minister Trivimi Velliste and the Chairman of 
my own ERSP party Ants Erm, all in relation to the Pullapää crisis. See reference number 2.
75 Regarding the weapons and their quality, see Toe Nõmm, “Eesti sõdurid ei pea oma varus-
tust häbenema,” /No need for Estonian soldiers to feel embarrassed about their equipment/ 
Eesti Ekspress, 9.11.2011.
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and complications76 of the weapons deal. Nor will I make any more com-
ments about the related media battles. However, I was and I still am con-
vinced that the first strikes in January and February 1993 against our 
nicely progressing cooperation with Israel emanated from three direc-
tions. Firstly, they came from the evident enemies of our state, the so-
called ‘formers’ (former Communist bosses), who still missed the Soviet 
Union and the journalists and editors that were still loyal towards them. 
Secondly, some of our über-nationalists from another corner of the world 
loudly joined this destructive game, especially as they happened to carry 
their own weaponry company in their back pocket. As the third hostile 
group I would mention the mass of people who always jump on every 
bandwagon. Together they delivered a fatal blow against the cooperation 
between Estonia and Israel with their exceptionally loud anti-Israeli noise 
(‘Jewish guns’ etc.) when the so-called ‘trophy weapons’ arrived in spring 
1994 .77 Of course, there were exceptions, decent and understanding reac-
tions, but they hardly came through. 
Our relationship with Israel was ended for good that spring by the 
defiant opposition of the Prime Minister and the new Commander of 
the Defence Forces, General Aleksander Einseln from the US. He had 
been against our relationship with TAAS from the very beginning. As he 
was leaving the Aegviidu training range after the showcasing of the TAAS 
weapons in May 1993, he provocatively declared that the American M14 
(used in the Vietnam War) was the best infantry weapon.78 The result was 
that after spring 1994 there were no further developments in relations 
between Estonia and Israel other than the already agreed upon weapons, 
payments and – court cases. However, foreign banks gradually began to 
76 Experts were not surprised that such larger quantities of weapons and amounts of money 
led to friction, disagreements, mutual accusations and court cases. This is a tedious daily occur-
rence in the big world, which is why international arbitration tribunals have been established.
77 See the brief and constructive explanation given by Colonel Laaneots, reference number 47. 
Apananski: “Some may think that getting 50 new anti-aircraft cannons to Estonia was a massive 
victory for us, but the end of the development of any further business relationships between us 
was the result of Estonia’s arrogance and impudence (to put it mildly).” (E-mail of Apananski 
to the author of 22 July 2014.)
78 E-mail from Apananski to the author of 22 July 2014.
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finance Estonian private businesses and open lines of credit, incl. for the 
companies belonging to Mr Apananski.79
Summary
Yes, Estonian politicians failed to turn the support of Israel into an inter-
nationally transparent opportunity. Because of the counteractions of 
‘homespun and inexperienced, often petty and rivalling men’, we did not 
manage to develop the planned wide-ranging contacts with Israel. 80 I had 
no doubts then and I am still convinced that our eastern neighbour was 
constantly meddling and interfering in every way possible.81
Still, our Israel arms deal allowed us to fully equip a light infantry 
division and make a security policy breakthrough to the West. Namely, 
people in Western capitals now began taking us more seriously and grad-
ually started to sell, lease and even donate weapons to us.82 We certainly 
built a strong foundation for the development of our Defence Forces 
with the Israeli weapons deal. The state’s security, defence capacity and 
79 Ibid.
80 E-mail from journalist Marica Lillemets to the author of 4 July 2014.
81 In spring 1993 the Head of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Olav Fageland 
Knudsen spoke about 60 officials in the headquarters of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Ser-
vice (SVR) whose main task was to keep an eye on the Baltics. We can only guess how many 
thousands of agents this successor of the KGB dispatched to the Baltics and how many hun-
dreds of them were active in Estonia and Tallinn. On the 13th of March 1993 Stockholm’s 
Dagens Nyheter quoted the chief of information of the SVR Juri Kobaladze, who allegedly said 
that “we’re very interested in what’s going on in the Baltics”. See Hain Rebas, “Vad väntar sig 
de baltiska staterna av Europa?” Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift = 
The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences proceedings and journal 4 (1994): 70, 57–72. E-mail 
from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014: “[---] I informed the Security Policy about these 
signals as well. There were probably enough such people in the Riigikogu and the political par-
ties, and the propaganda that we didn’t need national defence and the witch-hunt against you as 
someone who had come from the West were also related to the activities of the special services 
of our ‘friendly neighbour’.”
82 Then Prime Minister Mart Laar also writes: “[---] it was a real breakthrough that opened 
up opportunities to procure weaponry from the West for Estonia and also for the other Baltic 
States.” [Laar, Eesti uus algus, 160.]
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the people’s will to defend their country all increased. Perhaps, as Prime 
 Minister Mart Laar claims, it also hastened the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Estonia.83 In any case, the transaction led to the recogni-
tion of Estonia in the world of finance and was an important stage in the 
developing relationships of Estonia and NATO.
The transaction would never have succeeded without Leonid Apan-
anski’s efficient and inventive bridge-building with Israel, without the 
weapons expertise of Colonel Laaneots, without the strong backing of 
Prime Minister Mart Laar and without a decisive Defence Minister. We 
should also note that neither the Latvians nor the Lithuanians managed 
a breakthrough transaction like this. But we did! And let us not forget 
the patrons of our brave joint venture, President Lennart Meri and Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Moreover, the fact that the contract was profes-
sionally prepared in both economic and legal terms – in large measure 
due to the expertise of Jaan Manitski – was confirmed by a London Court 
of International Arbitration ruling in 2003. It resolved a long dispute 
between the parties and the Republic of Estonia won back 1.75 million 
dollars.
Finally, I am obliged to conclude that the Israeli/TAAS weapons that 
we procured in the face of a loud public outcry have served our men 
well, both at home and on foreign missions. Jüri Pihl, Director General of 
the Security Police at the time, wrote (2014): “The purchase of weapons 
from Israel was a new beginning for our Defence Forces, the Estonian 
Border Guard and the police”.84 General Laaneots summarises (2014) 
the events concisely and briefly, as befits a military man: “[---] The pur-
chase was necessary, it gave the Defence Forces all the essential weap-
ons and  equipment they needed and allowed them to progress in their 
development.”85
Shortly after our weapons deal the first representatives of the NATO 
Political Committee and its generals, led by AFNORTH Sir Garry John-
son, arrived in Tallinn, on the 25th of June and on the 12th of July, respec-
83 Laar, Eesti uus algus, 160.
84 E-mail from Pihl to the author of 13 August 2014. 
85 E-mail from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014.
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tively.86 There is no doubt about it that our so-called Israeli weapons deal 
remains one of the most significant security policy successes in the his-
tory of the restored Republic of Estonia.
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